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MIAMI-LOS ANGELES AND NEPA: THE USE OF THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969
AS AN ANTICOMPETITIVE WEAPON
JAMES M. BURGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE NATIONAL Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)' is viewed, in
part, as a measure which "establishes a national policy requir-
ing all federal agencies to give full consideration to environmental
effects in planning and carrying out their programs."' Accordingly,
as one might anticipate, NEPA often squares off environmentalists
and citizens groups on one side, and the agency on the other. The
names of leading NEPA cases demonstrates this fact: United States
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,' Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Department of Transportation," Save Our
Ten Acres v. Kreger [Acting Administrator, General Services Ad-
ministration],' and Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe [Secretary of
Transportation].!
There are few proceedings where members of regulated industry
have attempted to forestall competition by challenging the adequacy
of an agency finding under NEPA in order to delay a final decision.!
* B.A., M.A. and J.D., New York University, 1967, 1968 and 1971; Lecturer,
University of Virginia, School of Law. Mr. Burger is a practicing attorney in
Washington, D.C.
'142 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4327 (1970).
'Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 239 (1974).
3412 U.S. 669 (1973).
4 No. 76-1105 (D.C. Cir. May 19, 1976).
5 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
6 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972).
7E.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 621
(W.D. Ky.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1105 (1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Watson, 363
F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973).
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In a recent major Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) certification
proceeding-Miami-Los Angeles Competitive Nonstop case' (Mi-
ami-Los Angeles)-National Airlines, the incumbent carrier,
challenged the agency on precisely that basis. At the eleventh
hour, National asserted that the CAB had failed to consider ade-
quately the environmental impact of authorizing a second, competi-
tive carrier on the Miami-Los Angeles route.
The purpose of this article is two fold: (a) to examine National's
use of NEPA as a weapon to delay and attempt to prevent com-
petitive service in its lucrative monopoly market and (b) to review
the CAB's response to NEPA before, during and after Miami-Los
Angeles.'
In the recent "deregulation" or regulatory reform debate, one
of the main criticisms of the CAB, by both the "deregulators" and
the industry, has been the problem of procedural delay."0 In large
measure, this delay stems from the common agency (and particu-
larly CAB) fear of reversal by an appellate court. Since, as a gen-
eral rule, courts are barred from reviewing the substance of an
agency decision, appellate review tends to focus on procedure."
Accordingly, the CAB tends to spend excessive time and energy
on procedural matters. NEPA, as discussed below, fits basically
into the procedural mold.
II. NEPA's REQUIREMENTS AS THEY APPLY TO THE CAB
Section 102(2) (c), of NEPA requires that:
all agencies of the Federal Government shall . .. include in
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official
on... The environmental impact of the proposed action."
I CAB Docket No. 24,694, CAB Order No. 76-3-93, 2 Av. L. REP. 5J 22,202
(Mar. 15, 1976) [hereinafter cited to CAB Order No. 76-3-931.
, Chronologically, before means prior to the CAB's delegation of the environ-
mental portions of Miami-Los Angeles to the Director of the Bureau of Operating
Rights.
'"See Callison, Airline Deregulation-A Hoax?, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 747
(1975).
11 Essentially, factual findings that are supported by "substantial evidence" or
are not "arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion" will not be reviewed.
See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES ch. 29 (1976).
1242 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
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The focus here is on the threshold issue of whether a CAB action
in a route proceeding (particularly Miami-Los Angeles) is a major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the environ-
ment." Case law has established both (1) the standard for agency
determinations of whether an impact statement must be prepared
and (2) the Courts' role in reviewing that determination. Finally,
the CAB's role in reviewing environmental impact in route cases
is limited to ascertaining the cumulative and absolute impact of
the proposed service.
In the cases discussed below, it is evident that NEPA is not a
substantive restraint upon agency action. Congress did not say
that if a Federally funded highway will destroy a park the road
may not be built. Instead, NEPA requires the agency to examine
and set forth the consequences of its action and to insure that the
agency has considered less environmentally harmful alternatives.
In all kinds of areas, however, NEPA has been used for delay.
Often all resort to NEPA gains is delay. At times delay can be fatal,
for example, funds are no longer available, or a new administra-
tor takes office.
A. Criteria for Determining Whether or Not to Prepare an Impact
Statement
Perhaps the issue for the 1970's is the environment and whether
we can improve it or at least prevent further harm."' The difficulty
for administrative agencies is that NEPA appears "opaque '' " and
"woefully ambiguous."' This view is compounded by the fact that
economic regulatory agencies were often ill-prepared to understand,
let alone rule on environmental issues. Section 102, however, sets
some outside limits:
Congress obviously did not intend impact statements to be prepared
13 The requirements of an environment impact statement have been treated
in detail in R. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AcT ch. 4 (1973).
14See Cape May County Chapter, Inc. v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504
(D.C.N.J. 1971).
15 City of N.Y. v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
" Voight, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Independent Regu-
latory Agency, 5 NAT'L RESOURCES LAW 13 (1972). See also, Citizens for Reid
State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 789 (D. Me. 1972) " . . . the statutory
language 'significantly affecting the quality of the human environment' is ex-
tremely broad and not susceptible to precise definition."
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each time an agency proposes a trivial action, nor did it intend to
excuse all but the largest and most important actions from com-
pliance."'
Thus, "major federal action" and "significantly affecting" are quan-
titative standards. The result of this language is that courts have
been subjective in their determinations. Decisions do not delineate
specific guidelines which would permit an agency to distinguish
readily between "major" and "minor" actions and "significant"
and "insignificant" effects. Each case must be determined on its
individual facts.
Some cases, however, have set forth general guidelines. "Major"
and "significant" are considered limiting words:
The phrase 'major federal action' was clearly intended by Congress
to be a limiting phrase, designed to assure that not every action
of the Federal Government was subject to the rigors of NEPA.'
Similarly, Congress could have required an impact statement for
every major federal action. But by adding "significantly"
it demonstrated that before the agency in charge triggered that
procedure, it should conclude that a greater environmental impact
would result than from "any major Federal action.""9
Courts have been divided in deciding whether "major" and "sig-
nificantly" constitute two separate tests. In Hanly v. Mitchell (Han-
ly I)," the Court agreed with the government's contention that
"major federal action"
refers to the cost of the project, the amount of planning that pre-
ceded it, the time required to complete it, but does not refer to the
impact of the project on the environment. We agree with Defen-
dants that the two concepts are different and that the responsible
federal agency has the authority to make its own threshold deter-
minations as to each in deciding an impact is necessary. 1
17 ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 56.
18 Wilkey, Agency Functions in Light of Environmental Problems, 26 AD. L.
REV. 143, 149 (1974). See Julis v. Cedar Rapids, 349 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Iowa
1972); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356
(E.D.N.C. 1972).
'
9 Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 969 (1973).
20460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
21 Id. at 644.
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Hanly I cites Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird,"2 as support
for the two test theory. That case, however, sets forth the one test
view:
NEPA ... require[s] all federal agencies to incorporate as an in-
tegral part of their planning process consideration of the environ-
mental consequences of any proposed action, and wherever such
consideration indicates that the action may significantly affect the
quality of the human environment to prepare and file a detailed
impact statement.2
Citizens for Reid State Park never directly confronts the one versus
two test issue. In addition, the court relied heavily on the Depart-
ment of Defense procedural compliance guideline that defined
"major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the hu-
man environment" as any decision that would "either affect the en-
vironment on a large geographic scale or have a serious environ-
mental effect in a more restricted geographic area."' The better
view is that any federal action which significantly affects the human
environment requires an agency to prepare an environmental im-
pact statement. "[I]t makes little sense to find a project minor when
its affects are significant.
' '
2
In Hanly I, the Second Circuit remanded the decision of the
General Services Administration that the construction of a jail in
lower Manhattan was not a major federal action significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment. In Hanly II, the
court reviewed the redetermination of the agency affirming its pre-
vious decision not to prepare an impact statement.26 In Hanly II,
the court was persuaded that because Congress did not precisely de-
fine the terms, an agency is vested with broad discretion in deciding
whether a major federal action will "significantly affect the quality
of the human environment." The court found that the agency is
normally required to review the federal action in light of two
standards:
22 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972).
2 Id. at 788.
24Id. at 787 n.5.
25ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 90. For a detailed discussion of Citizens for
Reid State Park, see id. 89-96.
6 Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
969 (1973).
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(1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environ-
mental effects in excess of those created by existing uses in
the area affected by it, and
(2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of the
action itself, including the cumulative harm that results from
its contribution to existing adverse conditions or use in the
affected area. Where conduct conforms to existing uses, its
adverse consequences will usually be less significant than when
it represents a radical change."
A highway in an area already honeycombed with roads, for
example, would have far less impact than a street through a road-
less public park. 8 The intent of the language "significantly affecting
the environment" was intended to create a criterion of proximate-
ness; "The results must be somewhat direct and visible."'" Finally,
the court in Hanly II, found that before an agency reaches its pre-
liminary or threshold decision, the public must be notified of the
proposed major federal action and be given an opportunity to sub-
mit relevant facts and comments. The court further found, however,
that there was no need for a formal hearing.'
The courts are also divided as to whether, when reviewing a
threshold decision, a court must use the arbitrary and capricious
standard of the Administrative Procedure Act,"1 or the "standard
of reasonableness" test. The Hanly II court found that the threshold
NEPA decision presented a mixed question of law and fact. The
question of defining "significantly" is one of law. Whether the pro-
posed action will significantly affect the environment is a question
of fact. With respect to questions of law, a court normally deter-
mines such questions de novo." With respect to the factual issue,
Hanley 1 held that a court should determine whether the findings
are " 'arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion or otherwise not
in accordance with law' or 'without observance of procedure re-
quired by law.' ""
27471 F.2d at 830-31.
"See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
2Wilkey, supra note 18, at 149.
"0471 F.2d at 836.
'3 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970).
"Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. S 706 (1970); see 4 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 29.01 (1958).
83 471 F.2d at 828.
MIAMI-LOS ANGELES AND NEPA
As opposed to Hanly II's arbitrary and capricious standard, the
Tenth and Fifth Circuits have adopted the superficially more ex-
acting "standard of reasonableness." In Wyoming Outdoor Coor-
dinating Counsel v. Butz, the court stated:
We are persuaded that the general reference to discretion in [the
Administrative Procedure Act] . . ., does not apply here to the
agency's determination under NEPA. Under the specific terms
of NEPA we feel that the proper standard... is whether the nega-
tive determination was reasonable in light of the mandatory re-
quirements and high standards set by the staff so as to be "in ac-
cordance with law."'
The Fifth Circuit, in Save our Acres v. Kreger,' stated:
This decision should have been court-measured under a more re-
laxed rule of reasonableness . . . the spirit of the Act would die
aborning if a facile, ex parte decision that the project was minor
or did not significantly affect the environment were too well shield-
ed from impartial review. Every such decision pretermits all con-
sideration of that which Congress has directed to be considered
"to the fullest extent possible." The primary decision to give or to
bypass the consideration required by the Act must be subject to
inspection under a more searching standard.
A close examination of Hanly II reveals that its "arbitrary and
capricious standard" is no less exacting than the "standard of rea-
sonableness" test. The court's definition of "significantly"" and its
requirement for public participation suggests that the Hanly II
court closely examined the agency's threshold determination."7
Finally, in determining that the agencies have the authority to
make the threshold NEPA determination whether to prepare a
statement, the courts have held that the agency must make a rational
determination. The agency must "affirmatively develop a review-
able environmental record" and cannot limit itself to prefunctory
conclusions."5
-'484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973).
-472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1973).
"1 Text at note 27 supra.
17 See Anderson, supra note 2.
38460 F.2d at 647; see also Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs,
U.S. Army, 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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B. The CAB and the NEPA Threshold Determination
The Board's duty to consider the environmental issues predates
NEPA. In Palisades Citizens Association, Inc. v. CAB, the court
held "that questions relating to environmental impact of proposed
services upon persons and property lying below the routes are sub-
stantial and clearly relevant to the Board's certification inquiry."
The court labeled as "folly" the idea that consideration of the en-
vironment was not a proper issue for the CAB.
The difficulties faced by economic (as opposed to safety) regu-
latory agencies, such as the CAB, in analyzing environmental
issues, aside from the lack of technical expertise, are further com-
pounded in licensing proceedings. Usually, such agencies have the
power to issue broad licenses. On the other hand, curtailment or
restriction of the licensee's operations is statutorily limited. Fi-
nally, the activities of a licensee which may have an environmental
impact are often controlled in agencies other than the licensing
agency.
These problems are illustrated in First National Bank of Home-
stead v. Watson."1 There, the incumbent bank sought to enjoin the
Comptroller of Currency from approving an application to or-
ganize a second bank in its area of operation. The incumbent bank
contended that the Comptroller's action was illegal since the Comp-
troller had failed to comply with NEPA. The court found that while
licensing of the bank was a major federal action, here it did not
significantly affect the quality of the human environment.
The incumbent bank argues that a serious ecological crisis
threatened the area, and that any action which would increase
development, such as another bank lending funds, would adversely
affect the environment. In finding that the Comptroller had com-
plied with NEPA, the court noted that the incumbent bank or the
agency could only speculate as to the environmental laws and the
rising consciousness of ecological problems in the area. Thus, the
court found that here "the Federal action will possibly allow others
39 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
401d. at 191.
41 363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973). This is one of the few cases where an
incumbent licensee attempted to interpose NEPA against an aspirant applicant.
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to set into motion projects which possibly will affect the local en-
vironment.
4
CAB consideration of environmental issues is likewise affected
by lack of authority to curtail licenses and the control of other
agencies. Indeed, the CAB should have followed the First National
Bank case. First, the CAB may issue a broad license (certificate).
However, it is statutorily barred from limiting certain crucial as,
pects of the applicant's authority. In authorizing scheduled air trans-
portation, the CAB is limited by Section 401 (e) (4) of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 which states:
No term, condition or limitation of a certificate shall restrict the
right of an air carrier to add to or change schedules, equipment,
accommodations, and facilities for performing the authorized trans-
portation and service as the development of the business and the
demands of the public shall require.'
These are the very factors which will determine the environmental
impact of the proposed operations. Secondly, other agencies such
as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department
of Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) are vested with strong'powers to examine and
prevent adverse environmental impact resulting from the operation
of aircraft by CAB-authorized carriers."
Therefore, on the one hand, the CAB is powerless to regulate
the two most important phases of air carrier operations as they
affect the environment-schedules (i.e., frequency) and equip-
ment. Thus, it can only speculate as to the environmental impact
of licensing a carrier. On the other hand, other agencies, particu-
larly the FAA and the EPA, are specifically empowered to regulate
the environmental aspects of air carrier operations. Several recent
cases and FAA/EPA proceedings have illustrated this situation.
In Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, a number of citizens and en-
vironmental groups sought to enjoin the FAA from allowing stretch
Id. at 473.
4349 U.S.C. § 1371 (1970). See United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 278 F.2d 446
(D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated and remanded pending further legis-
lation sub. nom. All Am. Airways, Inc. v. United Air Lines, 364 U.S. 297 (1960).
"See A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw ch. 5, § 4 (1972); Federal Aviation
Act § 611, 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970); 14 C.F.R. pt. 36 (1976); Clean Air Act
of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858 (1970); EPA, AIRCAFT EMISSIONS: IMPACT ON
AIR QUALITY FEASIBILITY OF CONTROL (1972).
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Boeing 727-200 aircraft to utilize Washington National Airport.'
The court outlined a number of the elements of air transportation
at Washington National which effect the environment.
1. Noise abatement operational rules.
2. FAA high density rule limiting operations per hour.
3. Jet curfew.
4. Flight range restrictions.'
5. Equipment restrictions.'
All of these factors are essentially outside CAB control. Instead,
the FAA and the airport owner (at Washington also the FAA)
either impose environmental rules or work out voluntary restraints
with the air carriers. The CAB could certificate 50 new routes to
Washington; however, with FAA restrictions on capacity, the CAB's
action would have zero effect on the environment.
The limited environmental impact of CAB action is further
illustrated in Illinois ex. rel. Scott v. Butterfield." Plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against FAA and CAB actions
which had allegedly resulted in uncontrolled increases in aircraft
operations, noise, and air pollution at O'Hare International Airport
in violation of, inter alia, NEPA. The FAA and CAB moved to
dismiss. The laundry list of FAA "action" where the FAA had
allegedly failed in its duty under NEPA was quite extensive. The
agency was accused, for example, of permitting unlimited growth
in daily operations, improving electronic aids to increase capacity,
funding and approving new runway and taxiway constructions,
improving flight paths and failing to promulgate restrictive opera-
tional regulations. The CAB, on the other hand, was accused of
failing to prepare an impact statement as required by NEPA for
its "action" in establishing a policy for developing O'Hare as a
central airport for national and international commerce. The CAB
had moved to dismiss claiming that there were no facts showing
CAB adoption of such a policy.
The court replied that since this was a motion to dismiss, the
truth of Plaintiff's pleading would be assumed. The court refused
"344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972).
41 Short range flights are "less noisy" than long range flights, see note 171
inf ra.
47344 F. Supp. at 576.
4'396 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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to dismiss the suit;" however, it found that the validity of Plaintiffs
claim would rest on the failure of the CAB to evaluate further
increases in aircraft operations resulting from newly certificated
flights. The court's perception that the basic control of environ-
mental effect of aircraft operations rests with the FAA is well
founded in statutory law. The FAA has pervasive control over
aircraft operations through its authority to control the navigable
airspace." In addition, the FAA administers the Airport and Air-
way Development Act of 1972 through which new airports are
developed and older ones improved."' These actions, as noted above,
have a direct impact on the environment.' Moreover, the Noise
Control Act of 1972 requires that the FAA, after consulting with
EPA, shall provide,
for the control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom
including the application of such standards and regulations in the
issuance, amendment, modification, suspension, or revocation of
any certification authorized by this title."
The CAB's actions have far less impact on the environment.
Aside from the fact that it is barred from controlling schedules or
aircraft, individual CAB proceedings involve only a limited number
of flights from a limited number of points. Miami-Los Angeles
involved additional service at only two points, with a maximum of
three daily landing and take-off cycles (LTO's) at each point.'
The CAB cannot impose aircraft or schedule restrictions nor
does any one case usually involve massive increases in LTO's. Fur-
thermore, other agencies, especially the FAA and EPA are directly
responsible for the environmental impact of aircraft operations and
airport construction. Accordingly, a strong argument could be made
on this basis alone that the CAB's actions cannot have a significant
"' Counsel for State of Illinois has informed the author that no further pro-
ceedings have occurred at this time.
'
0 E.g., Federal Aviation Act 5 307, 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1970).
9149 U.S.C. § 1711. See FAA, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT,
DALLAS-FORT WORTH REGIONAL AIRPORT, DALLAS/FORT WORTH, TEXAS (1972).
"See American Airlines, Inc. v. Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y.
1967), afl'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968).
"Section 611(b)(1) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(1)
(Supp. V. 1975). See, for the initial notice, Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-
making, Civil Airpline and Fleet Noise Requirements, 38 Fed. Reg. 2769 (1974).
" See text following note 86 infra.
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impact on the environmental effect of aircraft operations. The
air carriers and airport owners must conduct their operations in
compliance with, at least, FAA and EPA environmental controls.
The CAB's position was, however, that in spite of the intense in-
volvement of other agencies, it "is highly sensitive to NEPA and
its requirements and objectives and it intends to adhere scrupulously
to NEPA's mandates and policies."
Rather than follow the First National Bank precedent," in Miami-
Los Angeles the CAB heeded the monopolist's request and deter-
mined to examine in detail the environmental impact of competition
in that market. In fact, in Miami-Los Angeles the use of NEPA
was most dramatic in that the actual environmental impact was
marginal at worst.
III. BACKGROUND TO MIAMI-Los ANGELES AND NATIONAL
RAISES NEPA AS AN ISSUE
A. Origin of the Miami-Los Angeles Case
The history of Miami-Los Angeles can be traced as far back as
1951. The significance and value of the route increased as the
Southeastern and Southwestern areas grew in economic importance.
In 1949, for example, 11.2 passengers traveled between Miami and
Los Angeles daily." In 1974, 622.9 passengers per day traveled
between the two points." Accordingly, Pan American World Air-
ways and every trunk carrier (except United Air Lines) vigorously
prosecuted their applications to be authorized as National's com-
petition between Miami and Los Angeles.
In 1951, the CAB denied a number of applications, including
one by National, for single carrier through service authority between
the West Coast and the Southeast." Instead, the Board authorized
"CAB, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Preparation of Environmental Im-
pact Statements, 39 Fed. Reg. 18,288, 18,289 (1974). A notable exception is in
foreign air carriers proceedings, "for the same route right or rights described in
a duly executed air transport agreement with the United States need not duplicate
the earlier compliance by the Department of State with the National Environ-
mental Policy Act incident to the execution of such agreement."
" 363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973).
"
7 Southern Service to the W. Coast, 12 C.A.B. 518, 574 (1951).
"CAB Order 76-3-93, at 7 (Mar. 15, 1976).
"'Southern Service to the W. Coast, 12 C.A.B. 518 (1951).
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an interchange.' Ten years later, the CAB authorized National to
operate nonstop between Miami and Los Angeles.'
In 1969, the CAB found that National's service was deficient and
that competition was required."2 Northeast Airlines, undisputably
the weakest trunk carrier, was granted Miami-Los Angeles author-
ity for route strengthening purposes.' Subsequently, it was suggested
that Northeast merely wanted the route as a bargaining chip in
merger negotiations." On September 18, 1969, the CAB affirmed
the award "[a]fter Northeast categorically advised the Board that
the carrier did not contemplate any merger ... "" Six days later,
Northeast announced it was negotiating a merger with Northwest
Airlines."0
As one might expect, in the subsequent Northwest-Northeast
Merger case, the CAB decided to exclude Miami-Los Angeles from
the routes to be transferred to Northwest." That was too bitter a
pill for Northwest to swallow; the carrier backed out of the merger.
Then, Delta and Northeast entered into a merger agreement. 8 The
CAB approved that agreement-again without the Miami-Los
Angeles route. Delta, however, accepted the decision, for the mo-
ment."
60 The Board authorized, inter alia, a National-Delta-American interchange.
Miami was thusly connected to the West. 12 C.A.B. at 549.
01 Southern Transcontinental Service Case, 33 C.A.B. 701 (1961). There,
Eastern Air Lines, an applicant for the route, attempted to thwart National's case
by raising an issue the CAB found unrelated to National's application. Eastern
had requested the CAB to find National unfit. The FCC had found National's
General Counsel and two Directors guilty of corruption. WKAT, Inc., 29 F.C.C.
216, 218 (1960). The CAB held:
Where, as here, we have an established and certificated air carrier
with many years of operating experience and no indication of im-
proper dealings with the Board or the public, we are unable to
make a finding that National Airlines is not fit, willing or able
within the meaning of the Act to properly and effectively operate
the Florida-California route being awarded to it.
33 C.A.B. at 727-28.
62 Southern Tier Competition Nonstop Investigation, CAB Order No. 69-7-135,
at 12-13 (July 24, 1969).
1 Id. at 17-18.
14 LOWENFELD, supra note 44, at 1-203.
01CAB Order No. 70-12-162/163, at 5 (Dec. 31, 1970).
0 8 LOWENFELD, supra note 44, at 1-203.
0 7CAB Order No. 70-12-162/163, at 7 (Dec. 31, 1970).
08 CAB Order No. 72-5-73/74, at 26-29 (May 19, 1972).
Delta later argued that if the CAB found a need for reinstating competitive
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Competitive service, such as it was,"° ceased in July 1972, when
Northeast ceased to operate as an independent carrier. On August
23, 1972, the Board instituted the Miami-Los Angeles Competi-
tive Nonstop Investigation."' No environmental findings were con-
tained in the instituting Order. Subpart J of the CAB's Organiza-
tional Regulations,"2 promulgated by the CAB in 1970, required
that in any proceedings which might result in a major Federal
action:
The Order . . . instituting the proceeding, including the indication
of the possible environmental consequences or the contemplated
action, will be published in the Federal Register . . ."
Accordingly, the CAB either failed to comply with its regulations
or determined that the case would not result in a major federal ac-
tion significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.
Most likely, the Board did not believe that replacement of North-
east on the Miami-Los Angeles route was a major Federal action
significantly affecting the environment.
B. Traditional Advocacy Tools in Miami-Los Angeles
In most route proceedings incumbents and aspirant carriers'
cases are usually framed by a standard set of arguments. Incum-
bents argue the adequacy of existing service and the threat of diver-
sion. Aspirants, on the other hand, argue inadequacy of existing
service, traffic growth and stimulation, and the importance of com-
petition. ' Among themselves, aspirants argue beyond and behind
services, strengthening weak carriers, identity, past innovative serv-
ice, and superiority of proposed service. All carriers, of course, at-
tack each other's interpretation of the facts and each other's service
proposals. Up until presentation of briefs to Administrative Law
Judge William H. Dapper, Miami-Los Angeles was, in this sense,
a routine or typical proceeding.
substitute service in the Miami-Los Angeles market, Delta, as a matter of law,
must be authorized to serve it. The CAB did not agree. CAB Order No. 76-3-93,
at 11-12 (Mar. 15, 1976).
70 Northeast was never an effective competitor in the market.
" CAB Order No. 72-8-95 (Aug. 23, 1972).
71PS-41, 35 Fed. Reg. 10,583 (1970).
73S14 C.F.R. S 399.110(b) (1975).
",See LOWENFELD, supra note 44, at 1-23 to 25.
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National argued that its service was adequate to meet the public
convenience and necessity, i.e., its load factors were low." Further-
more, National asserted that a second nonstop competitor would
divert a substantial amount of traffic resulting in lower load factors.
These projected load factors were, it said, unreasonable and well
below the CAB's standard established in the Domestic Passenger
Fare Investigation, Phase 6B (load factor) (DPFI 6B)." Finally,
National claimed that it intended to increase its service from two
to three DC-10 daily round trips."
The aspirants maintained that National had acted as a true
monopolist; it had neglected the market. National's load factor
argument was countered in three ways. First, the carriers noted
that National's breakeven load factor was 32 percent, over 10
points below its current load factor."' Therefore, to permit National
to operate without competition at a 55 percent load fatcor would
be unconscionable. Second, the CAB in DPFI 6B adopted indus-
try rather than "market or carrier load factor standards . . .',
Finally, the carriers argued that the CAB has consistently refused
to review the adequacy of an incumbent's service by reference to
proposed schedules."
" See Exhibits of National Airlines, NAL-302-I and NAL-307-I, Miami-Los
Angeles, CAB Docket No. 24,694 (June 13, 1973) (initial decision of Adminis-
trative Law Judge).
"CAB Order No. 71-4-54 (April 9, 1971). There, the CAB held that for
ratemaking purposes it would establish a 55 percent load factor standard for
trunkline carriers. In February, May, August and November, 1972, National
averaged a 42.3% load factor on the Miami-Los Angeles Segment. Miami-Los
Angeles, CAB Docket No. 24,694 (June 13, 1973) (initial decision of Adminis-
trative Law Judge).
" National Airlines Exhibit NAL-200-, Miami-Los Angeles, CAB Docket No.
24,694 (June 13, 1973) (initial decision of Administrative Law Judge).
"a Brief for Pan American, at 9, Miami-Los Angeles, CAB Docket No. 24,694
(June 13, 1973) (initial decision of Administrative Law Judge).
"CAB Order No. 71-4-54, at 27 (April 9, 1971). See dissenting opinion of
Chairman Timm in Southern Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation (Houston-
Miami Phase), CAB Order No. 73-2-89, at 11 (Feb. 23, 1973).
80 As Western points out, however, National would have the Board
look at the feasibility of competition in the light of the schedules
that National contends it will operate in the market during the
forecast year and then determine if there is still room for competi-
tion. The difficulty with National's approach is that competition
would rarely be certificated in a market regardless of the size be-
cause the incumbent carrier could almost always tailor its service
proposal for the forecast year in such a manner as to insure that
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Each of the nine aspirants argued that its competitive service
proposal would most benefit the public convenience and necessity.
Of the nine, Pan American World Airways submitted strong argu-
ments on each of the traditional factors:
1. Beyond-Segment Benefits: Pan American claimed outstand-
ing beyond and behind segment benefits. It forecast 163,100 annual
beyond-segment passengers or 223 passengers per day. 1
2. Traffic Diversion: Pan American argued that under the
growth offset theory, it would divert only /2 of 1 percent of Na-
tional's annual revenues or $2,083,000.'"
3. Route Strengthening: Although it had previously been denied
any routes within the contiguous 48 states, Pan American presented
an appealing argument that it should receive the Miami-Los
Angeles for route strengthening purposes." Between 1969 and
1972, Pan American had lost almost $166 million," its interna-
tional routes were the subject of vigorous competition from both
United States and foreign scheduled and supplemental carriers; and
it said that its costs abroad were higher than those incurred by
domestic carriers. Therefore, Pan American concluded that access
to a long-haul domestic route was necessary to strengthen its route
and improve its dismal profit picture.
4. Identity: Pan American also could claim a well-established
identity in both cities. It had begun service to Miami in the late
1920's and to Los Angeles in the early 1940's."
5. Superiority of Service Proposal: Finally, Pan American offer-
ed a strong service proposal. It would operate the largest number of
a reasonable amount of traffic would not be available to a new
carrier.
Miami-Los Angeles, CAB Docket No. 24,694 (June 13, 1973) (initial decision
of Administrative Law Judge).
81 Brief for Pan American, supra note 78, at 22-32.
82The growth offset method contrasts the incumbent's traffic in the forecast
year against a selected past year.
"Brief for Pan American, supra note 78, at 56-60.
"Pan American World Airways, Inc., Annual Report 1975. In early 1973,
no one could predict the effect of the post-October, 1973 fuel crisis. In the next
three years, however, Pan American lost another $162 million.
"Brief for Pan American, supra note 78, at 53-55.
"See P. TURNER, PICTORIAL HISTORY OF PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS,
chs. 2 & 4 (1973).
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seats-633,640-with two daytime B-747 roundtrips and one night
coach B-707.
C. National Injects NEPA Into the Miami-Los Angeles Case
Some seven months after institution of the proceeding, and after
the record had been closed, National argued in its brief to Judge
Dapper that the CAB had failed to comply with NEPA." National
also maintained that certification of a second Miami-Los Angeles
nonstop carrier would be a major federal action significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment,88 and accordingly, any
such CAB action would be invalid without the preparation of an
environmental impact statement. Furthermore, National said that
the record was inadequate to support an impact statement. Accord-
ingly, National asserted, the case had to be remanded and the rec-
ord reopened for environmental evidence.
National raised the following adverse impacts of reinstating
competitive service: increased fuel consumption, increased air and
noise pollution and increased congestion at airports."
On June 13, 1973, Judge Dapper issued his Initial Decision.
He found that Pan American should be authorized to provide
Miami-Los Angeles nonstop competitive service."0 The Judge se-
lected Pan American for essentially the traditional reasons asserted
by the carrier."
Judge Dapper did not receive National's eleventh hour environ-
mental argument warmly. He noted that:
National has had a full opportunity to present evidence with respect
to the environmental issue. The carrier, however, offered no evi-
dence dealing with this matter. National's tardy enthusiasm for
environmental matters has, of course, effectively deprived all the
other parties of any opportunity to comment on brief with respect
to National's contentions.",
17 Brief for National Airlines, at 50-54, Miami-Los Angeles, CAB Docket No.
24,694 (June 13, 1973) (initial decision of Administrative Law Judge).
:8 Id. at 55.
I d. at 50-54.
9 0Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 302.27 (1976) an Initial Decision becomes final
within 30 days unless a party files a Petition for Discretionary Review within
21 days or the CAB orders review on its own initiative within the 30-day period.
91 See Miami-Los Angeles, CAB Docket No. 24,694 (June 13, 1973) (initial
decision of Administrative Law Judge) 31, 38-57, 59-66, 68-81, 74-76, 82-85,
87-96.92 Id. at 97, n.129.
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The Judge responded to National's specific environmental concerns
as follows:
(1) Fuel-with the anticipated energy crisis, the air transporta-
tion system requires a total plan, not a case-by-case ad hoc pro-
gram.' Furthermore, Pan American already owns and operates the
aircraft to be used in Miami-Los Angeles service." Therefore, it will
probably consume the fuel in other markets anyway. In addition,
the amount at issue is very small in comparison with Pan Ameri-
can's overall fuel consumption. Accordingly, the positive benefits
to the public of competitive service far outweigh any adverse
effects of increased fuel consumption.
(2) Noise and Air Pollution and Congestion-Contrasted
against total operations at Los Angeles and Miami, the Judge
found that "it is clear that any such increases would be de
minimis."" He noted that at Miami, Pan American's operations
would amount to slightly more than one-half of one percent of
1971 operations, and less than one half of one percent of fiscal
1971 operations at Los Angeles." Finally, the Judge noted that the
communities involved had not complained about any potential
adverse ecological consequences of granting competing authority."'
Six days after the issuance of the Initial Decision, the CAB exer-
cised its discretion to review the Judge's Decision."' Briefs to the
CAB were due thirty (30) days later. In its brief National reiter-
ated its argument that "if competition was to be authorized, the
record should be reopened to provide the environmental impact
statement required by National Environmental Policy Act.""'
Like the Judge, the CAB had a visceral reaction that three round-
trips per day between Miami and Los Angeles could not "signifi-
cantly affect the quality of the human environment." Unlike the
Judge, however, the CAB was troubled that it did not have any
11 See CAB Order No. 73-5-123 (May 25, 1973), authorizing capacity dis-
cussions.
" Miami-Los Angeles, CAB Docket No. 24,694 (June 13, 1973) (initial de-
cision of Administrative Law Judge) 98-99.
9Id. at 99.
"Id. at 99-100.
97Id. at 99 n.132a.
"CAB Order No. 73-6-78 (June 19, 1973).
"Brief for National Airlines, Inc. at 37, Miami-Los Angeles, CAB Order No.
76-3-93 (Mar. 15, 1976).
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evidence in the record to justify its reaction."w The CAB could not
find any basis to change the Judge's environmental conclusion. On
September 27, 1973, however, the CAB decided "to give the fullest
consideration to the environmental questions raised by National....'
While finding the Judge's Statement sufficient, the CAB instructed
the Director of the Bureau of Operating Rights (BOR) to prepare
a statement regarding the environent:'
While the Board does not necessarily believe that further proce-
dures in this case are necessarily required under the judicial de-
cision interpreting NEPA, we are nonetheless desirous of complying
with the spirit as well as the letter of the statute."
Over 14 months later the Director issued a Final Statement of
Environmental Assessment. Finally, on March 15, 1976, some two
years and nine months after Judge Dapper issued his Initial Deci-
sion, the CAB granted the Miami-Los Angeles authority to Western
Air Lines."' The decision was split-Chairman Robson and Vice
Chairman O'Melia would have granted Pan American permissive
authority for three years in addition to Western's full authoriza-
tion." Why it took the CAB so long to decide this case, at least the
environmental phase, is discussed below. However, certain con-
clusions can be drawn as to the effective use of the environmental
issue and the short-term value of that maneuver to National.
D. Impact of NEPA on the Proceeding
One clear result of NEPA in Miami-Los Angeles was delay. The
second, arguable result is that Pan American did not receive the
award. That is not to say that Pan American's proposal was en-
vironmentally inferior. Instead, during the interval between June
13, 1973 and March 15, 1976, circumstances changed and the
10OThe CAB was accustomed to analyzing cases in terms of load factors,
growth offset, yields, etc. Environmental terms, even those relating to aircraft
such as NEF, EPNdb, Adjusted Aircraft Emission Rates, were completely foreign
to the CAB.
1 1 CAB Order No. 73-9-102, at 2 (Sept. 27, 1973).
' 
1 Miami-Los Angeles was also unique in that the BOR was not a party to
the case below. Apparently, since the CAB had determined that competitive
service was required, BOR had determined that its participation in carrier selec-
tion was not required.
', CAB Order No. 73-9-102, at 3 (Sept. 27, 1973).
' CAB Order No. 76-3-93 (Mar. 15, 1976).
105 Separate Statement of Chairman Robson and Vice Chairman O'Melia.
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CAB relied in part on those changed circumstances to deny the
award of Pan American. Finally, it became clear that National
received short-term financial benefits from the delay in implement-
ing competition.'The effort to give environmental questions the "fullest considera-
tion" delayed the proceeding 14 months. Primarily, this delay re-
sulted from the inexperience of both the carriers and the CAB.
Prior to 1971, the CAB had never issued a detailed environmental
assessment. In addition, the BOR and the carriers were simultane-
ously coping with the environment assessment in the far more com-
plex Transatlantic Route Proceeding, (Transatlantic).. and in sev-
eral less complex cases.'
It is clear that the delay resulted in Pan American's failure to
win at the CAB level. Examination of the CAB decision, however,
reveals that three of the four major factors relied upon the CAB to
select Western over Pan American materialized more than six
months after the Judge's decision.'" These four factors were: (1)
focus of the CAB on the Miami-Los Angeles segment; (2) route
strengthening; (3) the traffic downturn during 1974 because of
the energy crisis; and (4) Pan American's reduction in service.
10 The author acknowledges the counter-argument that the delay could have
resulted from factors apart from preparation of the Environmental Assessment.
It could be argued that other factors really caused the 33-month delay and if the
CAB wanted to expedite the case, it could have. Only the CAB can authoritatively
settle the argument. It is the author's position, however, that NEPA delayed the
proceeding long enough to permit circumstances to change sufficiently to result
in further delay and to result in the CAB arriving at a different conclusion than
the Judge.
107 CAB Docket No. 25,908 (Jan. 17, 1975). A decision was submitted to
the President on July 15, 1976. See Exec. Order No. 11,920, 41 Fed. Reg. 23,665
(1976); S 801 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). A Final
Order has yet to be issued in this proceeding. Besides the east coast gateways
some 16 cities had been selected by the CAB for consideration as U.S. coterminals
in Transatlantic. CAB Order No. 73-9-83 (Sept. 21, 1973). Furthermore, 22 car-
riers had filed applications. Prehearing Conference Report of Administrative Law
Judge Ross I. Newmann 5 (Dec. 17, 1973).
'0'American-Frontier Route Exchange Agreement, CAB Order No. 75-8-94
(Aug. 18, 1975); American-Airwest Route Exchange Agreement, CAB Order No.
75-8-93 (Aug. 18, 1975); American-Pan Am. Route Exchange Agreement, CAB
Orders No. 75-6-152, 75-6-153 & 75-6-154 (April 18, 1975).
'0IThis discussion assume that the criteria contained in CAB Order No.
73-9-83 (Sept. 21, 1973) were those which influenced the CAB members. Opinions
are not written by the members or their assistants. Instead, the Orders are writ-
ten by the CAB's permanent staff. Therefore, decision making and opinion are,
to this degree, separated. See LOWENFELD, supra note 44, at 1-151.
MIAMI-LOS ANGELES AND NEPA
(1) Route Delay-One significant justification for selection of
Western rather than Pan American was the CAB's concern that
the competing carrier focus its attention on the Miami-Los Angeles
segment."' The CAB noted that Pan American proposed "to use
the Miami-Los Angeles segment... as a transcontinental bridge,
linking points as far as 10,000 miles apart."' Thus, the CAB be-
lieved that on-route delays and operational disruptions over the
long route would compromise service over the local segment.
Accordingly, the CAB found Western's proposed service more
attractive with turn-around and through service to only a single
beyond point."'
(2) Route Strengthening-While the Board's concern for the
Miami-Los Angeles segment is at least superficially not related to
delay, its position on route strengthening appears to result from
changed circumstances. Pan American in 1976 was substantially
different from Pan American in 1973. While still not a healthy,
highly profitable carrier, it had effected many economy moves in
the intervening years. A month after its decision in Miami-Los
Angeles, the CAB noted that these economy moves have "produced
an impressive and encouraging turnaround in Pan American's fi-
nancial picture.""... On the other hand, the award to Western was
"consistent with the Board's historic policy favoring award to
smaller carriers on route-strengthening grounds. .
"' CAB Order No. 76-3-93, at 23-24 (Mar. 15, 1976).
Id. at 23.
"'The Judge had found that aside from Pan American, only Western had be-
yond benefits of any significance. Miami-Los Angeles, CAB Docket No. 24,694
(June 13, 1973) (initial decision of Administrative Law Judge) at 60. The CAB
also found that Western's lack of identity in the east was made up by its strong
identity at Los Angeles and the fact that two-thirds of the traffic originates in the
west. CAB Order No. 76-3-93, at 17 (Mar. 15, 1976).
"I CAB Order No. 76-4-90, at 4 (April 19, 1976). There, the CAB ordered
any interested person to show cause why the CAB should not deny Pan American
subsidy.
"'
4 CAB Order No. 76-3-93, at 21 (Mar. 15, 1976). The CAB found that the
Judge had misinterpreted "route strengthening."
However, "route strengthening," as traditionally perceived by the
Board, pertains to the Board's policy of allowing smaller carriers
to grow at a faster rate than larger carriers in the interest of indus-
try balance and the creation of a more viable air transportation
system as a whole. Pan American, of course, is one of the largest
carriers in the industry, particularly in terms of assets, revenue pas-
senger-miles, length of hop and length of haul; and indeed, its
recent financial improvement appears to be related to its retrench-
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Thus, as to the route-strengthening issue, the passage of time
disabled Pan American.
(3) The 1974 Economic Crisis-Another and the third major
decisional factor-the fuel crisis and downturn in traffic-did not
arise until after the Judge's decision. The CAB found that "traffic
did not reach the predicted level in CY 1974."'' . The three daily
roundtrips and 633,640 annual seats offered by Pan American
were found to be based on a "more sanguine forecast of the growth
of the Miami-Los Angeles market.""11 Thus, the CAB held that Pan
American's 300,000 additional seats were not warranted.
(4) Pan American's Reduction in Service-The final major
basis for not awarding the route to Pan American clearly occurred
subsequent to the Judge's decision. On January 30, 1975, nineteen
months after the Judge's decision, the CAB approved a joint appli-
cation by Pan American and Trans World Airlines to temporarily
restructure their route systems." ' The CAB, in that proceeding,
accepted Pan American's arguments that extraordinary relief was
required to "help alleviate the carrier's current financial difficulties
attributable to overcapacity in international markets, skyrocketing
fuel costs and a significant decline in international traffic.
'118
More significant than its suspensions in the Atlantic, however,
was Pan American's drastic reduction of services in the Caribbean.
On April 2, 1975, the CAB permitted Pan American to unilaterally
suspend service at the United States Virgin Islands, Martinique,
Guadaloupe, Merida (Mexico), and between New York and San
Juan. ' Moreover, on July 1, 1975, the CAB approved the Ameri-
ment efforts. Thus, on a comparative basis, it has no claim to the
Miami-Los Angeles route on the grounds of the "route strength-
ening" criterion.
Id. at 21 n.31. But see, Chicago/Atlanta-Jamaica Service Investigation, CAB
Order No. 72-4-150 (May 1, 1972), where Pan American was selected over
Delta to strengthen Pan American.
I9 CAB Order No. 76-3-93, at 6 (Mar. 15, 1976). While traffic between 1972
and 1973 grew by about seven percent, traffic growth dipped to about three per-
cent during 1974.
I"6 Id. at 18-19. Western offered two daily nonstop DC-10 trips with 342,000
annual seats.
"7 CAB Order No. 75-1-133 (Jan. 30, 1975). The agreement resulted in cer-
tain mutual suspensions and exemptions resulting in less operations for Pan
American in the Atlantic and more in the Pacific.
191d. at 3.
1 CAB Order No. 75-4-16 (April 2, 1975).
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can-Pan American Route Exchange Agreement wherein Pan
American agreed to suspend service at Bermuda, Barbados and
Santo Domingo.12 In addition, Pan American was authorized to
suspend service at several other Caribbean points.121 The CAB con-
cluded that:
many circumstances have changed since the close of the economic
hearing in 1973, including substantial alterations in Pan Ameri-
can's route structure and service patterns. These changes fatally
undermine Pan American's asserted ability to flow enough traffic
over the Miami-Los Angeles segment to support its proposed level
of service. The heart of the matter is that, since the close of the
hearings, Pan American has been in the process of giving up cer-
tain of its existing service obligations as part of a worldwide re-
trenchment program designed to restore financial health to the
financially ailing carrier. Pan American's retrenchment has resulted
in the total elimination or significant reduction in service in markets
that were to have produced essential contributory traffic for its
Miami-Los Angeles operations.'
It should be remembered these reductions and alterations were
largely accomplished at the urging of the Department of Trans-
portation and the CAB."2 Thus, at least in part, as a reward for
heeding the CAB's call to retrench its services, Pan American was
denied a route which it claimed was "superb for [its] system."''
Available statistics show that the average route case in 1972
required 288 days from initial decision to CAB decision." Ac-
cordingly, other factors being equal, the Miami-Los Angeles deci-
"'CAB Order No. 75-6-152 (July 1, 1975).
221 CAB Orders No. 75-8-143 (Aug. 8, 1975); 75-6-48 (June 10, 1975). For
additional Pan American suspensions, see CAB Orders No. 75-7-97 (July 21,
1975); 75-6-95 (June 20, 1975); 75-4-117 (April 24, 1975); 75-4-19 (April 3,
1975); 74-12-66 (Dec. 18, 1974); 74-12-30 (Dec. 9, 1974); 74-12-29 (Dec. 9,
1974).
12 CAB Order No. 76-3-93, at 26 (Mar. 15, 1976).
"'See CAB Order No. 74-9-62 (Sept. 18, 1974) where the CAB denied Pan
American's petition for temporary subsidy. See also CAB Order No. 75-1-133,
at 7 (Jan. 30, 1975) where the CAB said: "We view [the Pan American-TWA]
agreement as but the first of many self-help programs .... The applicants should
consider implementing immediately such other cost-saving programs as unilateral
suspension .. "
'" Brief for Pan American at 40, Miami-Los Angeles, CAB Order No. 76-3-93
(Mar. 15, 1976). Pan American claimed first year benefits of $14.5 million.
"' REPORT OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD ADvISORY COMMITTEE ON PRO-
CEDURAL REFORM (Dec. 31, 1975).
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sion would have been issued in April or May 1974. One can only
speculate, of course, as to what would have happened; but an
educated speculation, based on the changed circumstances above
is that Pan American would have received the authority."
One clear result of the environmental delay was a short-term
economic gain for National: "the fortuitous profits that National
has enjoyed as a result of the absence of effective competition in
the market since it was first authorized by the Board in 1969..'"..
National itself estimated that Western would divert between $4.7
and 6.7 million in the first year." Pan American, according to
National, would divert between $8.1 and $10.2 million."9 Thus,
National's short-term gain was between $9 and $19.6 million.3 9
The long-term gain or loss is not at all clear. Whether Pan Ameri-
can (or any other carrier) would have been a less effective com-
petitor than Western will be, is a matter of speculation beyond the
scope of this article. In 1976, however, the CAB concluded that
Western would be the most effective competitor.
IV. THE CAB's REACTION TO NEPA
Part II above concluded that the CAB could have complied with
NEPA by following the First National City Bank precedent. The
CAB could have noted its lack of control over schedules and equip-
ment and, conversely noted FAA and EPA's control over airport
construction, aircraft construction, aircraft navigation, and so on.
1
"An alternative argument is that the CAB's "route moratorium" established
in 1969 was a significant factor in the delay and ultimate award to Western.
.See SuBcoMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 94th CONG. 1ST SESS., CAB PRACTICES & PROCEDURES 84-87
(1976). Again, however, the delay attributable to the environmental assessment
set the stage for further delay. Moreover, the CAB had already determined in
1969 that competition was required on this route. Finally, "the decision to hear
city-pair route issues in a formal decision has meant as a practical matter, that
new or additional authority will in fact be awarded." CAB STAFF STUDY, THE
DOMESTIC ROUTE SYSTEM: ANALYSIS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 38 (Oct.,
1974).
127 CAB Order No. 76-3-93, at 10 (Mar. 15, 1976).
'1 Brief for National Airlines, supra note 99, at 34.
129 Id. National's predicted diversion from all applicants ranged from $4.5
million to $10.2 million.
1390 This figure is somewhat overstated since National was on strike for three
and one-half months. But National received mutual aid payments calculated, in
part, on its monopoly position on the route.
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Instead, the CAB determined to examine in detail the environ-
mental impact of a relatively small change in operations.
The CAB's reaction to NEPA can be broken down into three
phases: Pre-, Post-, and during the Miami-Los Angeles/Transat-
lantic Route Proceedings. Prior to these cases, CAB treatment of
the environmental issue was usually pro forma."' During both cases,
the CAB's energies, the demand on the carriers, and the considera-
tion given the environmental issues were, viewed in isolation,
excessive. Finally, in the wake of the two proceedings, efforts to
comply with NEPA matured to the point where the expenditure of
unnecessary resources was minimized.
A. Pre-Miami-Los Angeles! Transatlantic Route Proceedings
As previously noted, irrespective of NEPA, the "public interest"
criteria of the CAB contained in Section 102 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act requires consideration of the environmental impact of
CAB action. Prior to the enactment of NEPA, there was no
formal treatment of environmental issues; instead, these were
treated on an ad hoc basis. Generally, environmental issues were
raised by citizens groups.
In the Washington/Baltimore Helicopter Service Investigation,
a group of civic associations and property owners urged the CAB
to deny applications for authority to conduct helicopter operations
within the metropolitan Baltimore and Washington area and the
three area airports, or alternatively, to reopen the record for further
environmental evidence.'" The CAB refused to reopen the record
and granted a certificate to one of the applicants. The CAB justi-
fied its conclusion on three bases. First, a substantial amount of
evidence had been adduced, including a comprehensive DOT study.
Secondly, while new service might add some noise, and possibly add
increased disturbance on the ground, Congress mandated that the
CAB develop a well-rounded air transportation system and pro-
mote air service. Accordingly,
[w]here as here, a new service will achieve these ends, it is re-
quired by the public convenience and necessity despite the fact that
some additional noise may be the result. Where there is a showing
"I See text following note 71 supra.
13249 C.A.B. 346 (1968).
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on the record of unusual noise by an opponent of the service, a
different result might be indicated.'
Finally, the CAB noted that Congress specifically directed other
agencies to protect the public from the noise and air pollution
created by air operations.
NEPA, of course, requires all agencies to incorporate in their
decision-making a regularized method of considering environmental
impact. Therefore, on June 25, 1970, the CAB adopted PS-41,
implementing NEPA. Curiously, this regulation was incorporated
into the CAB's Policy Statements rather than into its Procedural
Regulations.1' Aside from paraphrasing NEPA, this first set of
procedures was somewhat spartan: if a proceeding might result in
a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, the CAB order instituting the proceeding
would contain the possible environmental consequences. The order
would, as normally is the case, be published in the Federal Register.
In addition, the CAB was to serve the order on DOT, EPA, other
agencies listed in the Council on Environmental Quality's guide-
lines with special expertise as to the possible environmental impact,
and the affected states' governors."
The threshold for "major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment" was found to be
primarily, but not exclusively, those licensing activities which re-
sult in the authorization of air transportation
(i) to an area not previously served by air transportation: or
(ii) to be operated under conditions or with equipment which
might result in changes significantly affecting noise or air pollution
levels.'"
This definition follows the CAB's rationale in the Washington-
Baltimore Helicopter case. Unless the proposed action constituted
new service or significant (unusual) pollution or noise, the thresh-
old question would not be given further consideration. Of course,
what "significant" or unusual" actually meant was left undefined.
'I' ld. at 354.134 Generally, rules, governing this conduct of proceedings are contained in
the CAB's Procedural Regulations. There have been other exceptions, for ex-
ample, 14 C.F.R. 5 399.61 (1976) governs the presentations of public and civil
bodies in route proceedings.
14 C.F.R. § 399.110(b) (1975).
Id.
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Finally, in those cases which triggered this threshold test, the
record was to include sufficient data to, in effect, prepare an en-
vironmental impact statement.'37 Nothing in this CAB rule imple-
menting NEPA gave a true yardstick for determining whether the
threshold for preparing an impact statement had been crossed. It
was an invitation for anyone to allege that any route proceeding
would result in an action which "significantly" affected the environ-
ment. The result would be, and was, a rather massive effort to
gather facts, the relevance of which would, in large part, be doubt-
ful. That, of course, was precisely what happened in Miami-Los
Angeles.
Before Miami-Los Angeles the CAB normally invoked Section
399.110 only in unusual cases. An example was the Northeast
Corridor VTOL Investigation."3 ' That case did not produce a final
environmental assessment or impact statement since the CAB never
issued a final decision. A smaller in scope but similar case which
resulted in an "environmental assessment" was the Reopened TAG-
Wright case.1 ' There, an air taxi, Wright Air Lines, Inc., sought
a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate aircraft
between the downtown airports at Cleveland and Detroit. Because
this was a novel case, the Bureau of Operating Rights (BOR) filed
a motion to invoke the Section 399.110 procedures. The CAB
reluctantly granted the BOR's motion:
although the situation presented is not precisely the kind contem-
plated by our Policy Statement implementing [NEPA], we are in
the early stages of our consideration of environmental issues and
we deem it appropriate in this instance and at this time to move in
the direction of a full record for the determination of the question
whether our action here "might result in a major Federal action
significantly affecting the environment."''"
In a page and a half, the Administrative Law Judge found that
Wright's proposed operation would have no adverse affect on the
environment. This conclusion was based on the substitution of 14
daily large turbo-prop operations for 15 daily operations performed
with small piston equipment. In addition, the Judge relied heavily
137 14 C.F.R. § 399.110(d)(3) (1975).
'CAB Order No. 71-1-74 (Jan. 15, 1971).
"' CAB Order No. 72-2-52 (Feb. 14, 1972).
'
40 CAB Order No. 71-5-9 (May 4, 1971).
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on an FAA statement and testimony of the City of Cleveland and
the City of Detroit that Wright's proposed operations would not
measurably change noise exposure levels or materially affect air
pollution at either airport.1"' The Wright case was similar to the
Northeast Corridor case in that unusual operations were proposed
(in Wright-from a downtown airport, and in Northeast Corridor
-unusual equipment from downtown airports).
Two cases where the CAB refused to act were the Petition of
the City of Inglewood for Decertification, Inc." and Complaint of
the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc." In the first case, the
City of Inglewood sought the decertification of one or more of the
carriers authorized to serve Los Angeles International Airport.
Inglewood alleged that such action would decrease congestion and
therefore be environmentally beneficial. In addition, if operations
were decreased, load factors would increase and thus result in more
economic operations. The CAB denied Inglewood's petition. While
the CAB acknowledged its duty under NEPA, it held that even
assuming it had the power to accomplish all the changes requested
by the City, the disruptive consequences of the action would more
than outweigh any potential benefits. The CAB also noted that due
to a capacity agreement between the various carriers, approximately
nineteen departures a day had been eliminated at Los Angeles.
Finally, the Board noted that "Inglewood's primary goals of air and
noise pollution abatement are the subject of continuing efforts by
other agencies (e.g. The Federal Aviation Administration and the
Environmental Protection Agency) . . ." Considering the Board's
more limited and "less suited regulatory tools", employment of the
Board's time as requested by Inglewood would not have been
"worthwhile." 1
"
In the second case, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
(NRDC) sought an investigation of the CAB's implementation of
NEPA. NRDC alleged that the CAB failed to satisfy Section 103
of NEPA, which requires all federal agencies to examine their
statutory authority to determine any deficiencies which would pre-
141 Reopened TAG-Wright Case, CAB Docket No. 22,034, Initial Decision of
Administrative Law Judge Ross I. Newmann 27-28 (Sept. 22, 1971).
141 CAB Order No. 72-2-41 (Feb. 11, 1972).
14 CAB Order No. 71-7-140 (July 26, 1971).
I"CAB Order No. 72-2-41 (Feb. 11, 1972).
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vent "full compliance with the purposes of" NEPA. NRDC alleged
that the CAB failed to consider (1) the conflict between NEPA
and Section 401 (e) (4) (preventing CAB restrictions on schedules
and aircraft), (2) the inconsistency between NEPA and the CAB's
mandate under Section 103 of the Federal Aviation Act to promote
air transportation, and (3) methods of using its various powers to
improve the environmental impact of air commerce. Finally, the
NRDC sought revision of the CAB's report to the Council on En-
vironmental Quality; in the report, the CAB stated that its current
statutory authority was fully adequate to comply with NEPA and
that there was no basis for proposing legislation to correct any in-
sufficient CAB power to comply with Section 103 of NEPA.1"'
The CAB, "after careful deliberation," dismissed NRDC's com-
plaint. The CAB found that Section 401 (e) (4) was not a "defici-
ency" preventing it from complying fully with NEPA. The CAB
stated that, for example, its action in the Domestic Passenger Fare
Investigation, "was designed to discourage excessive schedules and
was based in part on . . . environmental considerations . . .""
The CAB also found that its actions in areas other than route
certification would not "often rise to the NEPA standards . . ."
On the other hand, the CAB noted that in all cases, it encouraged
the participation of interested parties to assist in forming a "mean-
ingful record" on "environmental impact." The CAB concluded
that its position on participation of interested parties and its
Policy Statement (Section 399.110) would "insure 'that presently
unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given
appropriate consideration in decision-making along with economi-
cal and technical considerations,'" as expressed by Section 102 (B)
of NEPA.
147
B. The Miami-Los Angeles/Transatlantic Route Proceeding
"'Ere"**
National's forcing the environmental issue in Miami-Los Angeles
had a broader effect than just delaying the CAB's ultimate decision
"I Letter from CAB to Council on Environmental Quality (Oct. 2, 1970).
" CAB Order 71-7-140, at 3 (July 26, 1971). See, Domestic Passenger-Fare
Investigation Phase 6B-Load Factors, CAB Order No. 71-4-54, at 6, 13, 24
(April 9, 1971).
" CAB Order No. 71-7-140, at 5 (July 26, 1971).
I" As noted inf ra, these cases were not the only focal point of NEPA at the
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in that case. It forced the CAB, and consequently the carriers, to
take a look at the CAB's prior treatment of NEPA.'4'
Pursuant to the CAB's instructions, on October 19, 1973, the
Director, BOR, directed the parties to the Miami-Los Angeles case
to furnish environmental evidence.' The seven page list attached
to the Director's letter included some 25 major categories of infor-
mation to be supplied.
The Director's request could be broken down into three cate-
gories: (1) Some of the required information was readily avail-
able to the carrier parties through their operations divisions; e.g.,
"fuel requirements of each type of aircraft which each carrier pro-
posed to use.. ."" (2) Some information was obtainable, but not
so readily available, for example, "an analysis of peak and off-peak
hours at each day of the week" or "[t]otal frequencies (landings and
takeoffs) at the Miami-Los Angeles airports for all air carriers and
general aviation operations. . .... Most of this information was in
the hands of the DOT/FAA. Finally, (3) some information just
did not exist, or was impossible to obtain without prohibitive ex-
penditures; for example, "total emissions of the various pollutants
in an average cruise mode (other than LTO operations) for an
average flight path.. .,"' Without hanging a "bucket" out at twenty
thousand feet or, more seriously, expensive experimentation with a
pressure wind tunnel, such data did not exist and could not be
obtained. In addition, the information would be useless; even with
the latest meteorological forecasting techniques, it would be virt-
ually impossible to measure the incremental or cumulative impact
of the relatively minute amount of engine emissions over a two
CAB. The two American route exchange cases were also focal. There, much
time and effort were spent in developing data which contributed to the resolution
of NEPA.
"'No specific CAB statement can be located that recognizes that Miami-Los
Angeles spawned a deeper interest in NEPA. The CAB, in its proposed Part 312
rule making (note 125 supra), pointed to the Remanded Reno-Portland/Seattle
Nonstop Service Investigation, CAB Order No. 73-11-75 (Nov. 16, 1973). That
Order, however, traces it origin to the Miami-Los Angeles Case. Id. at 3 n.7.
"' Letter from William B. Caldwell to all parties in Docket No. 24,694 (Oct.
23, 1973). See CAB Order No. 73-9-102 (Sept. 27, 1973).
... Letter from Mr. Caldwell, supra note 150, at 1.
152 Id. at 2.
15 Id. at 1.
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thousand, three hundred thirty mile route during the course of a
future year.
Actually, considering the lack of expertise, the BOR did an out-
standing job in conscientiously working to assemble a sensible
assessment of environmental impact."' Those information requests
which were impossible to comply with were eliminated. Others were
modified so that they more specifically related to actual environ-
mental impact. The burden on the carriers, however, was not ap-
preciably lightened. Instead, the impossible was eliminated but the
difficult job of measuring actual noise and emissions impact, par-
ticularly during the LTO cycle, remained.
With one case brought to a halt by NEPA, the Board was thus
confronted with the question of environmental procedures in a
number of other on-going cases. Some of the major pending cases
at that time1" involved significant (in economic terms) changes in
services at numerous points by many carriers. Nevertheless, the
Miami-Los Angeles environmental requests were required in all
those cases."
In two of the American route exchange cases (Frontier and Air-
west), American engaged outside consultants to prepare the en-
vironmental evidence.15 This case involved relatively simple opera-
tional changes-basically switching carriers with minor increases
and several decreases in flights. In addition, American naturally
desired to expedite these cases. It contracted with R. Dixon Speas
Associates (Speas), noted for aviation planning and research, to
supply the environmental evidence requested by the BOR. The re-
sult in the American-Frontier case after considerable effort and
expense, 58 was a bound booklet of one hundred forty-two pages and
154 While many BOR staff members assisted in this effort, the single Bureau
Counsel primarily responsible for NEPA compliance was Ivars V. Mellups.
"'Transatlantic Route Proceeding, CAB Docket No. 25908 (Jan. 17, 1975);
Capacity Reduction Agreement Case, CAB Order No. 75-7-98 (July 21, 1975);
Remanded Reno-Portland/Seattle Nonstop Service Investigation, CAB Order No.
75-11-45 (Nov. 12, 1975); cases cited in note 108 supra.
116See, e.g., CAB Order No. 73-11-75, at 2-3 (Nov. 16, 1973); Reopened
Service to Omaha & Des Moines Case, CAB Order No. 73-11-31, at 2-3 (Nov. 8,
1973).
"'The BOR's request was issued on November 2, 1973, shortly after the
BOR's request in Miami-Los Angeles.
'"Two months and $50,000 were spent in each case.
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thirty-one oversize graphics and a twenty-nine page separately
bound conclusion.
The American effort included a great deal of complex informa-
tion. It did not supply, of course, information requested which was
impossible to supply. The evidence did, however, thoroughly cover
the three major areas of environmental impact: fuel consumption,
engine emissions at the airport, and noise exposure at the airport.
The environmental evidence supplied by American set the essential
pattern for the submissions in the Miami-Los Angeles and the
Transatlantic Route Proceeding.
Both fuel consumption and engine emissions were relatively
simple to calculate. Fuel consumption was essentially broken down
to two phases: LTO cycles and enroute. LTO cycles were broken
down into six phases: prior to engine start, start and taxi-out, take-
off, climb-out, approach and land, and taxi-in. Once the times for
each of these elements were established, the engine manufacturers'
data on fuel flow were applied and a total fuel consumption was
obtained. The fuel estimate without the route exchange and with
the route exchange were then compared to the total U.S. scheduled
industry consumption. The result was that the American-Frontier
Route Exchange would cause an estimated relative increase of
seventy-one hundredths of one percent. American characterized
that amount as insignificant in comparison with the total United
States scheduled industry consumption.
Engine emissions were calculated in much the same manner,
except that emissions for all carriers operating at the airport were
calculated. Speas used carrier exhibits and FAA data to determine
the over-all pollution level at each airport at issue. They found that
pollution would decline slightly because of a favorable change in
the types of aircraft to be operated.
On the other hand, calculation of noise exposure was far more
complex to calculate and required a great expenditure of energy
and money. The first step was to determine actual flight pathways at
each airport. To do this, Speas surveyed each airport individually
and engaged in detailed conferences with FAA air traffic control
personnel. From this detailed field work, American's consultant
determined:
(1) runway use patterns;
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(2) conditions influencing runway use (noise abatement procedures,
meteorological parameters, applicable ATC rules and regula-
tions, crosswind/tailwind criteria utilized, etc.);
(3) arrival-departure fixes with associated inbound and outbound
typical flight paths;
(4) runway limitations (displaced thresholds, length and weight re-
strictions;
(5) flight track vertical profile limitations;
(6) method of assignment of flights to specific tracks."
Speas calculated the daily noise exposure with this flight track,
plus the individual noise footprint"' and aircraft operations data0
(adjusted by categorization of operations according to equipment
type and take-off weight)."'0 Speas employed the Aircraft Sound
Description System (ASDS) to determine the change in noise ex-
posure as a result of the American-Frontier Exchange.' The result
of this extensive noise research was that at six airports there would
be no difference in the noise impact with or without the route ex-
change. Only at two airports would there be a single increase in
exposure. In both cases, Speas concluded that in all cases the
amount of the noise change would be too small to be perceived by
the human ear.
The larger Transatlantic Route Proceeding involved some
twenty-eight domestic cities and some thirteen carrier applicants.
151 R. Dixon Speas Associates, Conclusions on the Environmental Assessment
of the American-Frontier Route Exchange Agreement (Jan. 11, 1974). See
American Airlines, Inc. & Frontier Airlines, Inc. Route Exchange Agreement,
Initial Decision, CAB Docket No. 25,397, at 27-38 (Aug. 5, 1974).
160 The "noise footprint" is defined as that area on the ground, expressed in
acres, exposed to noise levels of 85 dBA or greater on one LTO cycle at maximum
gross weight.
'e' The operations at each airport, by type of aircraft were determined
for the past years by reference to FAA from 7230 data and CAB
41T-3 reports, and by use of the Official Airline Guide and local
airport records to determine the carrier group and equipment of the
small residual of operations.
R. Dixon Speas Associates, supra note 159, at 9-10.
162 Speas estimated the distribution of air carrier operations by weight and
type using the Official Airline Guide analyzing the distribution of flights by stage
length. Longer haul flights normally weigh more because of increased fuel car-
ried thus taking longer periods of time to climb out and therefore exposing more
ground to noise than do short haul flights with less fuel on board.
163ASDS was adopted by the FAA as its method for calculating community
noise exposure caused by aircraft operations. FAA Order No. 7040.2 (Aug. 10,
1973).
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Considering the fifty thousand dollar cost for six cities and two
carriers, and the finding in the American-Frontier Route Exchange
that a change in several flights in any hub airport would result in,
at worst, imperceptible changes, the carriers in the Transatlantic
case decided that there had to be another way.' " This determina-
tion was reinforced by an EPA study which showed that even a
twenty percent reduction in flights at a hub airport would have a
minimal or imperceptible impact on airport noise levels."
One possible solution was to attempt to employ the expertise
already existent at the Department of Transportation (DOT). The
DOT had spent a good deal of time and money amassing pollution
and noise data. DOT had prepared noise exposure data for the year
1972 and a forecast for the year 1968 for some twenty-three air-
ports, all but two of which were involved in the Transatlantic
case."' Counsel for American advised the Bureau of Operating
Rights (BOR) that DOT experts could indicate noise evaluation
methodology "margin of error." Given that margin of error, DOT
experts could indicate the number of increased operations that
would be required before a measurable change would occur.
The BOR, however, rejected this proposal. BOR noted that the
DOT study was created for evaluating the cost and benefits of
retro-fitting older, noisier planes with noise abatement equipment.
In addition, the forecast year for the Transatlantic case was 1975,
whereas the forecast year for the DOT study was 1978. In addition,
DOT told BOR that it would cost upwards of three thousand dollars
per airport to modify its study. The BOR firmly indicated that it
regarded the responsibility for preparation of environmental evi-
dence to be that of the carrier applicants." While it appeared that
164 One consulting firm, not Speas, quoted a figure over $200,000.00 just to
prepare the environmental material. This did not include reproduction, distribu-
tion, and the cost of appearing as a witness.
1"5 See Shumann, Airport Noise Unaffected by Flight Cuts, AVIATION WEEKLY
AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Feb. 4, 1974, at 29.
1I See DOT letter to Administrative Law Judge Ross I. Newmann (Jan. 25,
1974) and letter from Counsel for American Airlines (Jan. 30, 1974) in CAB
Docket No. 25,908.
117 Letter of BOR to Administrative Law Judge Ross I. Newmann, March 1,
1974:
It is the Bureau's position that the basic responsibility for accumu-
lating data and preparing environmental forecasts, either indepen-
dently or through consultants, lies with the carrier applicants. The
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the carriers had to begin anew, in fact they had suggested a rela-
tively efficient method of examining noise impact: a threshold
screening test.
At the same time the BOR was preparing its letter, counsel for
Pan American, on behalf of the carrier applicants in Miami-Los
Angeles, was working with Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.""8
(BB&N) to develop a noise screening analysis. On March 14,
1974, BB&N submitted to Pan American a memorandum contain-
ing the methodology for such a noise screening analysis."9
BB&N's noise screening analysis was based on Noise Exposure
Forecast (NEF) methodology. Like the Aircraft Sound Descrip-
tion System, NEF is one method of measuring the effects of aircraft
noise on the ground. Basically, the NEF is an average noise level
over a twenty-four hour period expressed as contour lines surround-
ing a given airport. NEF is essentially a planner's tool. The area
contained between the NEF thirty and forty contour lines, while
livable, will not be comfortable for all persons. The area closer to
the airport, and wholly contained within the NEF forty contour, is
considered unacceptable for any uses except those which can ac-
commodate high levels of noise.
While planners carefully identify NEF as a zone of reasonable-
ness rather than an absolute measurement, the NEF system is valu-
able because NEPA and other environmental legislation require
planners to select among various alternatives. Therefore, some cri-
teria are required. The NEF system does offer a decision-making
tool because the methodology reveals changed circumstances. The
danger of NEF is that it might be used outside the planning area
in an attempt to use it as an absolute standard. Such things as local
Bureau is prepared to work with the carriers and/or their con-
sultants by coordinating input data and assumptions and to take
final responsibility for the environmental statement. We are not
technically prepared to develop the multitude of environmental
studies which are required. Unless such studies are performed by
carriers, jointly or individually, with or without the aid of DOT's
study or other consulting firms, the Bureau will be unable to submit
an assessment of the noise impact which may result from the award
of new or renewed authority in this case.
18 Bolt, Beranek and Newman are consultants in acoustics and vibrations and
were subcontractors to Speas in the two American Route Exchange cases and
had done acoustic work for the DOT.
See Enactment of Part 312, App. A, 40 Fed. Reg. 37,196 (1975).
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topography and other secondary noise sources, such as highways,
can result in blanketing-out of noise within any given NEF contour,
thus making the NEF irrelevant to specific local conditions.
The problem for the carriers and the consultants in CAB pro-
ceedings was devising a defensible criteria for indicating whether
or not there would be a perceivable change as opposed to what the
actual change will be. In other words, it was necessary to establish
a threshold determination to show whether a discernable change
will occur if a carrier's proposed service plan was operated. If such
a change is indicated, then it would become necessary to use more
precise tools to determine the local effects of that change. If the
threshold is not crossed, then no further study would be needed.
In a study prepared for the Presidential Aviation Advisory Com-
mission" BB&N developed a mathematical model for determining
the area contained in an NEF noise impact contour. Essentially,
the model is based on the number of operations at an airport.
BB&N's NEF model includes adjustments which weight (1) night
time operations, (2) the older, noisier, four-engine, Low Bypass-
Ratio aircraft (Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8), and (3) long-
range operations." 1
In the screening analysis, BB&N's formula was used to compare
the area enclosed between the NEF thirty and forty contour before
and after implementation of the carrier's proposal. The idea of this
comparison was to identify those changes in noise impact so that
even a questionable increase would receive detailed analyses. EPA
studies showed that an increase of five NEF units would cause
complaints and that an increase of two NEF units might cause
complaints.172 BB&N and the carriers believed that detailed analyses
should be conducted for any change which might possibly cause
'Bolt, Beranek & Newman, Inc., Report No. 2218, Aircraft Noise Analysis
for the Existing Air Carriers' System (Sept. 1, 1972) (prepared for the Aviation
Advisory Commission).
171 BB&N's model computes the relationship between the NEF contour area
and the airport operations in the following formula:
Area of Contour = A
. 
10 [10 log N + 24 - NEF + C]
15
where A is a constant related to fleet mix and NEF contour, N is the effective
number of operations, NEF is the contour value and C is the total of adjustment
for day vs. night, 4-engine Low Bypass-Ratio (LBPR) and short vs. long-haul
operations.
'Enactment of Part 312, 40 Fed. Reg. 37,184, 37,185 (1975).
MIAMI-LOS ANGELES AND NEPA
complaints. Accordingly, the screening analysis was designed to
include a wide margin of safety, and a single unit of NEF change
was selected as the threshold.
On March 8, 1974, seven days after BOR rejected the carrier
proposal to use DOT data, counsel for Pan American and Ameri-
can, with representatives of Speas and BB&N, met with BOR coun-
sel and proposed that a noise screening analysis be used in the
Transatlantic Route Proceeding. At that time, BOR promised to
consider carefully the screening methodology.
Shortly after BB&N delivered its memorandum outlining the
screening analysis, the nine carrier applicants in Miami-Los Angeles
engaged Speas and BB&N to perform the screening analysis it1 that
proceeding. The cost for this analysis was twenty-three hur dred
dollars, which included developmental costs for evolving the poise
screening analysis. This was a far cry from the fifty thousand dol-
lars which it originally cost to comply with BOR's environmental
evidence request. Over a month later, all the carrier parties to the
Transatlantic Proceeding (including National) engaged the con-
sultants to perform the noise screening analysis for twenty-nine of
the cities at a cost of only twenty-five hundred dollars."*
The carrier parties in Miami-Los Angeles submitted the noise
screening analysis and other environmental responses by the end of
April. The more extensive material in the Transatlantic Route
Proceeding was not submitted until the end of May, 1974. The
BOR filed its draft statement of environmental assessment in both
proceedings on August 2, 1974. The BOR accepted the concept
of a noise screening analysis and specifically stated:
[I]t is concluded that the BB&N noise exposure screening procedure
-supplemented where necessary by more detailed noise analysis-
is an acceptable method of determining whether any particular
proposal before the Board is significant in terms of adverse noise
impact, and whether any further, more detailed noise analysis is
required."'
171 Both Speas and BB&N, particularly Dr. Carl Robart at Speas and Andrew
H1arris at BB&N, worked very hard and in a most professional way to dramatical-
ly reduce the cost of their services.
"
4 BOR, Draft Statement of Environmental Assessment, Transatlantic Route
Proceeding (Aug. 2, 1974). The BOR, apparently, for the first time accepted the
BB&N noise screening analysis in its Draft Statement of Environmental Impact
in the Capacity Reduction Agreements Case 49-54 (June 27, 1974).
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Final statements of environmental assessment in Miami-Los
Angeles and the Transatlantic Route Proceedings were issued De-
cember 23, 1974 and October 15, 1974, respectively. In both pro-
ceedings, despite some questions by DOT and an outright attack
on the BB&N analysis by the town of Suffield, the BOR maintained
its acceptance of the screening analysis. The BOR answered Suf-
field's attack, stating:
The short of the matter is that Suffield's objections are misdirected
since it is obvious that the heart of the controversy lies not in the
de minimis impact of non-stop Transatlantic operations at issue
here, but in the question of air service and consequent noise impact
at Bradley in general. However, the Board is not here passing judg-
ment upon the acceptability vel non of the present environmental
circumstances at the airport, but rather upon the question of
whether there will be any further measurable adverse impact as a
result of any action it may take herein.
For this purpose, the noise analysis conducted by Bolt Beranek
and Newman, and accepted by the Bureau, is entirely adequate,
as we discussed previously . . . in fact, as we noted earlier, the
"trigger" requiring further detailed noise analysis is very light,
representing perhaps one-half of any noise impact change which
anyone would notice. Thus, the screening analysis will precipitate
a detailed NEF or LdnlLeq analysis in any instance where there
is the mere possibility of a measurable adverse change, as in the
case of Minneapolis/St. Paul (Draft, Appendix H).""
The CAB adopted the BOR's final statement of environmental as-
sessment in both cases. In most of the other pending cases the car-
rier parties employed the BB&N noise screening analysis, which
BOR accepted in environmental assessments or environmental
negative declarations.
Adoption of the noise screening analysis enabled the carrier and
the CAB to deal with the NEPA issues in a simplified manner,
both from the point of view if complying with the congressional
intent and eliminating a significant procedural impediment which
seriously delayed numerous cases. However, both the carriers and
the CAB staff believed that compliance with NEPA ought to be
regularized and refined. Therefore, the next step was to engage in
a rulemaking procedure to accomplish that purpose.
1 BOR, Final Statement of Environmental Assessment, Transatlantic Route
Proceeding 19 (Oct. 15, 1974).
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C. Post-Miami-Los Angeles! Transatlantic Route Proceeding
On May 14, 1974, the CAB proposed a new rule to govern the
implementation of NEPA.'" Under the proposed rules, the CAB
avowed faithfulness to NEPA and recognition of the practical re-
alities of air transportation operations. The CAB proposed to ac-
complish this goal through the use of a regularized system of con-
sidering NEPA issues in many more cases than it had previously.
The carriers, while in favor of new rules governing the implementa-
tion by the CAB of NEPA, objected to some of the complexities of
the proposed rule and the failure of the CAB to include threshold
screening analyses. In turn, the carriers proposed both the use of
BB&N noise screening analysis and a pollution analysis developed
by Speas. In its final rulemaking, the CAB adopted both the car-
rier's suggested screening tests.
In its explanatory statement, the CAB reiterated the basic prem-
ise of its earlier Policy Statement that the relationship between its
actions and the environment are essentially "peripheral." Again, the
CAB maintained that other agencies have a far more direct con-
trol over the environmental effects of air transportation and air-
ports than the CAB, and that these agencies have far greater ex-
pertise in those areas. Furthermore, according to the CAB, NEPA
is not involved in most of its actions in that most are not "major"
and do not "significantly" effect the quality of the human environ-
ment. Finally, the CAB notes that it must act "expeditiously or the
benefit is lost irrevocably.".. The CAB desired to avoid placing
itself in a "procedural straight-jacket" which would create undue
delay.
On the other hand, the CAB also reiterated its high sensitivity
to NEPA and its requirements and objectives and [the CAB]
intends to adhere scrupulously to NEPA's mandates and policies.
We believe that the greatest public good will flow from our actions
if they accommodate the objectives of NEPA and the Federal
Aviation Act. To this end, the proposed regulations seek not only
to be faithful to NEPA and the protection and enhancement of
the environment, but also to the practical realities of air transpor-
tation operations to the extent that they are essential to the achieve-
176 CAB, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Preparation of Environmental Im-
pact Statements, 39 Fed. Reg. 18,288 (1974).
"Id. at 18,289.
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ment of the promotional and other objectives to the Federal Avia-
tion Act."'
In its proposal the CAB set forth those actions which it believed
would have a potential effect on the environment. Those were (1)
certification or foreign air permit proceedings (Section 401 or 402
respectively), (2) (a) agreements affecting air transportation un-
der Section 412, (b) merger or other control proceedings under
Section 408, (c) exemption proceedings under Section 101 (3) or
416(b), and (d) CAB instituted rate proceedings under Section
1002 of the Act. Those proceedings in the second (2) category
would only be considered an action with a potential effect on the
environment if they "demonstrably" would result in:
(i) authorization of service to the points not served by air trans-
portation,
(ii) "substantially greater or lesser" service in a market or to a
point,
(iii) first, additional or reduced service by helicopter, V/STOL
aircraft or supersonic aircraft,
(iv) change or first service to a point where a national park, na-
tional historic park, national military park or national monument
(except the Statue of Liberty or any national monument located
within the city limits) is located, or
(v) "any change in service the environmental impact of which
is likely to be highly controversial.' 7 In addition, the CAB would
consider the potential NEPA issues in any rulemaking or legislative
proposals which might result in service changes similar to those out-
lined above. Finally, the CAB included the catch-all category of
any other action which would require substantial commitment of
resources or "trigger" such a commitment which possibly might
have a significant effect on the environment.
The proposed rule would require any applicant requesting the
CAB to act in any of the above matters to prepare an environ-
mental evaluation to accompany its application. The evaluation
would describe the services and traffic impact of the proposal (num-
ber of flights, departure times, aircraft types, airport used, and
traffic forecast). The evaluation would describe the environment
178 Id.
"I Id. at 18,292.
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at the affected points, the probable impact of the proposed action
on the environment and finally, address each of the environmental
results that the CAB considers would significantly affect the en-
vironment.
The proposed rule contained a list of results from CAB actions
that the CAB believed would significantly affect the environment.
Those were actions which would significantly increase air pollution
or the ambient noise level for a substantial number of people; des-
troy or significantly derogate from an important recreational area;
significantly affect areas of historical, cultural, educational, or
scientific significance; have significantly adverse aesthetic or visual
effects; or have a detrimental effect on safety. The CAB noted that
the list was not all-inclusive. Furthermore, in determining if an
action was a major federal action significantly affecting the environ-
ment, the Board would consider: environmentally controversial
actions, the cumulative effect of actions, actions of mixed environ-
mental effect, secondary or indirect effects, and the effect of the
action upon the local environment.8 '
Under the proposal, after the environmental evaluations were
filed, the CAB staff would make an initial determination of the en-
vironmental impact of the proposed action. Three alternatives
would be available: (1) an environmental rejection, (2) an en-
vironmental negative determination, and (3) an environmental
impact statement. The environmental rejection would be used
if the action would not be "major" or that the resulting conse-
quences are inconsequential, frivolous, or "not cognizable under
law...' The rejection would consist merely of a letter containing
the CAB findings.
Where it was found that an environmental rejection was not
appropriate, but an environmental impact statement would not be
required, an environmental negative declaration would be prepared.
The declaration would contain facts and reasons for reaching the
negative declaration, a description of the proposed action and a
summary of any probable environmental impact. Finally, if the
proposed action may reasonably be expected to result in a major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human en-
10 id, at 18,293.
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vironment, the CAB would notify the parties, public, EPA and
CEO that an environmental impact statement will be prepared.
If a complex or controversial action were contemplated, the
environmental impact statement and the environmental negative
declaration would both be subjected to the same procedural steps.
Essentially, those steps would consist of obtaining further environ-
mental information in the form of an environmental assessment
from the parties, and if necessary, a draft declaration with a period
for comments, a final declaration placed into the record, a hearing,
and adoption by the Administrative Law Judge and eventually the
CAB.'28
Nine air carriers joined together to comment on the Board's Pro-
posed Rulemaking. 'l The nine endorsed the essential elements con-
tained in the CAB's proposal. Although, the carriers believed that
the proposal would comply with NEPA, they maintained that some
changes should be made to improve the efficacy of the rule. Pri-
marily, the carriers urged the CAB to change its rule substantively
to permit the use of screening analyses to eliminate environmentally
insignificant actions, and to accomplish this by adopting noise and
pollutant screening tests to accomplish that task. The carriers sug-
gested that the Board adopt the BB&N noise screening analysis and
the Speas pollutant emissions screening procedure.
The BB&N noise screening analysis, of course, was that used in
Miami-Los Angeles and the Transatlantic Route Proceeding. Like
the noise screening analysis, the purpose of the pollutant screening
standard was to determine when a change in flight frequencies at
an airport would justify closer examination of its environmental
effects. The standard was based on pollutant dispersion analysis
technique applied to EPA emissions data. The threshold was set
below the relevant units of the National Air Quality Standards de-
termined by the EPA." Essentially the pollutant screening stan-
dard results in an order of magnitude estimate of particular pollut-
ant concentrations at airport boundaries. If the proposed CAB ac-
"'See chart on page 571.
'83American Airlines, Braniff Airways, Delta Air Lines, Eastern Air Lines,
Northwest Airlines, Pan American World Airways, Trans World Airways, United
Airlines, and Western Air Lines.
"'See Comments of the Nine Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
Environmental Matters, CAB Docket No. 26,718, at 10, & attachment C at 6-8
(Sept. 5, 1974).
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'
8 2 The following is a graphic representation of the proposed NEPA pro-
cedures:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT,, JNCLUDING.THE PREPARATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS
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tion would result in an increase in total pollutant emissions, but
the change in concentration at the airport boundary would be less
than one percent of the air quality primary standards, no further
pollutant emissions analysis would be required. If the threshold
level were exceeded, additional analysis, which took into account
specific local conditions, would be required. The screening standard
has been used in two earlier cases where the CAB staff prepared
negative declarations.18
Finally, the nine carriers disagreed with the CAB's proposed
timing of environmental evaluation submissions. Rather than have
environmental evaluations filed with an application, they suggested
that it be due with the direct exhibits in a hearing case or thirty
days after the application in a non-hearing case. Essentially the
nine carriers argued that the proposed schedules are not formulated
until the time of direct exhibits.
In its promulgation of the new environmental regulations, the
CAB adopted both the noise and pollutant screening analysis;"
however, the CAB rejected the carriers' proposed procedural
change. Otherwise, the CAB basically adopted its proposed en-
vironmental regulation. Subsequently, in response to a petition of
the nine carriers requesting modification, the Board relented and
set the time for filing an environmental evaluation within thirty days
of the date of any CAB order setting an application for hearing,
unless otherwise specified in that order. Thus, the Board finally
adopted a set of regulations which regularized its compliance with
NEPA.
CONCLUSION
This article examined National Airlines's use of legislation de-
signed for environmental protection to delay competition. That
action, in fact, resulted in an economic benefit for the carrier.
Furthermore, that delay created a situation where the top contender
for the route-Pan American-lost the award.
It is clear that National's maneuver could only be used once.
181Pan Am. W. Route Transfer, CAB Docket No. 27,104 (July 11, 1975);
Reopened Service to Omaha and Des Moines Case, CAB Order No. 70-7-24
(July 6, 1970).
"
8 Enactment of Part 312, 40 Fed. Reg. 37,184, 37,185 (1975).
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National recognized that fact when it joined with other carriers to
produce environmental data in the Transatlantic Route Proceeding
where National was an applicant for authority. Finally, National's
action did have one beneficial aspect: it forced the CAB and the
carriers to take a hard look at the CAB's compliance with NEPA,
and produce a regularized system of dealing with NEPA issues.
While the Board could have relied on the First National Bank
precedent, the over-compliance in producing its environmental
rules should insulate the CAB against judicial review.

